Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Singapore\u27s Land Transportation Infrastructure by Dolnik, Adam
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Law - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Business and Law 
1-1-2007 
Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Singapore's Land Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Adam Dolnik 
University of Wollongong, adamd@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dolnik, Adam: Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Singapore's Land Transportation Infrastructure 2007, 
1-22. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/298 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Assessing the Terrorist Threat to Singapore's Land Transportation Infrastructure 
Abstract 
The highly lethal attacks against land transportation targets in Madrid and London have sparked 
considerable amount of debate in Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land transportation 
infrastructure. How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is the central question 
addressed in this paper. While transportation targets in general have always been a terrorist favorite, in 
recent years there has been an increased emphasis on attacking soft transportation targets such as 
mass transit. There are several distinct reasons for this development, including the increasing difficulty of 
successfully striking other targets, the ease of producing large number of casualties, the panic-spreading 
universality of the city bus or metro car, economic impact on the afflicted state by crippling workforce 
mobility and deterring foreign investment and tourism, symbolic value, and an overall high probability of 
success and a low level of risk. Indeed, since 1991 more than 42 percent of terrorist strikes worldwide 
were directed specifically against land transportation, producing the highest casualty rates of any type of 
terrorist attack. With regards to the threat to Singapore’s transit system, analysis of Jemaah Islamiya’s 
ideology and targeting patterns reveals an increasing preference for soft, Western, mass-casualty targets 
in Southeast Asia. But while Singapore’s commuter transportation system fully encompasses all of these 
adjectives, the recently weakened Jemaah Islamiya currently possesses only very limited capability to 
strike this type of target with significant results. Still, other adjacent threats exist including a possible 
attack by a home-grown terror cell, attempted suicides by deranged individuals, or the disruption of 
service via a wave of hoaxes by pranksters or terrorist group sympathizers. Despite the relatively low level 
of threat, Singapore has made many preparations and preventive measures that other countries that have 
experienced surface transportation terrorism have identified as pillars of effective public transportation 
security. These essentially include prevention, effective response and timely mitigation, and psychological 
defence measures. 
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The highly lethal attacks against land transportation targets in Madrid and London have 
sparked considerable amount of debate in Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land 
transportation infrastructure. How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is 
the central question addressed in this paper.
While transportation targets in general have always been a terrorist favorite, in recent years there 
has been an increased emphasis on attacking soft transportation targets such as mass transit. There 
are several distinct reasons for this development, including the increasing difficulty of success­
fully striking other targets, the ease of producing large number of casualties, the panic-spreading 
universality of the city bus or metro car, economic impact on the afflicted state by crippling work­
force mobility and deterring foreign investment and tourism, symbolic value, and an overall high 
probability of success and a low level of risk. Indeed, since 1991 more than 42 percent of terrorist 
strikes worldwide were directed specifically against land transportation, producing the highest ca­
sualty rates of any type of terrorist attack.
With regards to the threat to Singapore’s transit system, analysis of Jemaah Islamiya’s ideology 
and targeting patterns reveals an increasing preference for soft, Western, mass-casualty targets in 
Southeast Asia. But while Singapore’s commuter transportation system fully encompasses all of 
these adjectives, the recently weakened Jemaah Islamiya currently possesses only very limited 
capability to strike this type of target with significant results. Still, other adjacent threats exist in­
cluding a possible attack by a home-grown terror cell, attempted suicides by deranged individuals, 
or the disruption of service via a wave of hoaxes by pranksters or terrorist group sympathizers.
Despite the relatively low level of threat, Singapore has made many preparations and preventive 
measures that other countries that have experienced surface transportation terrorism have iden­
tified as pillars of effective public transportation security. These essentially include prevention, 
effective response and timely mitigation, and psychological defence measures.
KEYWORDS: land transportation, threat, terrorist, Jemaah Islamiyah, MRT, bombing
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Introduction
On 11 March, 2004, ten 5-10 kilogram bombs exploded on board four trains in 
three Madrid stations during the morning rush hour, killing 190 people and 
injuring over 1,400 more in what at the time was the ninth deadliest terrorist 
attack in world history. Then on 7 July 2005, three suicide bombers exploded 
their devices within 50 seconds of each other on three London Underground 
trains, with a fourth bomb exploding on a bus nearly an hour later. 52 people were 
killed and about 700 were injured in the most lethal terrorist attack in the history 
of the United Kingdom.1
Both Madrid and London have sparked considerable amount of debate in 
Singapore about the terrorist threat to the local land transportation infrastructure. 
How real is this threat and what can be done to counter it? This is the central 
question that this working paper will seek to address. First, the global trends in 
land transportation terrorism will be discussed, along with an analysis of the 
scope of reasons behind land transportation becoming an increasingly attractive 
terrorist target. Secondly, the paper will focus on threat assessment with regard to 
the possibility of an attack on transportation infrastructure in Singapore, with a 
particular focus on the al Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, a group 
that had developed plans to attack the country’s transportation infrastructure in 
the past. And finally, an overview of measures that could be implemented to 
mitigate the threat will be provided.
Trends in Transportation Terrorism
Transportation in general has been one of the most preferred terrorist targets, 
consisting of more than half of all terrorist attacks overall. This trend is highly 
disturbing; particularly in light of the fact that attacks against transportation 
targets have been extremely lethal when compared to other terrorist targets. 
Particularly in attacks against land transportation targets, terrorists have utilized 
the full terrorist arsenal: bombings, sabotage, arson, capture of hostages, dispersal 
of chemical and biological agents, roadside ambushes, and assaults with standoff 
weaponry.
The initial terrorist attacks against transportation in the late 1960s focused 
primarily on commercial airliners, which represented the highly visible symbols 
of nations, confined “containers” of hostages, as well as mobile platforms 
providing the terrorists a chance of escape. Since 1968 and the PFLP hijacking of 
an E1A1 airliner from Rome to Algiers, the favorite mode of attacking aviation 
targets included the hijacking of aircraft, with the goal of taking hostages for the 
instrumental purpose of forcing governments into political concessions. 
Following increased security measures at airports consisting of a mandatory
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installation of metal detectors and other devices for boarding gate screening of 
passengers and luggage, along with increased international cooperation, 
successful hostage rescue raids of Entebbe and Mogadishu, and the increasingly 
tougher stance of many governments on the issue of granting concessions to 
hijackers, the hijacking of an airliner became an increasingly challenging task. 
This resulted in a change of modus operandi among many terrorist groups. While 
some organizations simply shifted their attention form aviation targets onto land 
based symbolic targets such as embassies,2 others responded by modifying their 
tactics thereby shifting the gravity of aviation terrorism to shooting attacks and 
bombings of airports and airliners in midcourse flight. Since 1980, 225 attacks on 
civilian aircraft or airports have occurred worldwide, with two-thirds (150) being 
attacks on civilian aircraft and one-third (75) being attacks on airports.3 
Governments were once again forced to modify their security measures in order to 
counter this new threat. As a result the emphasis was now placed on the threat of 
bombing of airliners in midcourse flight, as opposed to hijackings. Especially the 
1988 bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight over Lockerbie, solidified the perception 
that hijackings as a terrorist tactic had greatly diminished.4 These changes, while 
effective in some ways, again opened new opportunities for terrorists to exploit. 
For instance, prior to 9-11 it was perfectly feasible to overtly bring items such as 
knives and other bladed weapons on board domestic flights in the U.S., under the 
condition that the length of the blade did not exceed four inches. On September 
11th 2001, 19 hijackers exploited our misjudged dismissal of the hijack threat, and 
by using a tactic that has already been overlooked as nearly obsolete, they 
succeeded in perpetrating the most destructive terror attack in history. This 
example reminds us about the amorphous nature of the terrorist threat, which 
should force us to constantly challenge and reevaluate the basic assumptions upon 
which our security framework is based. Today, aviation security has been boosted 
not only by improved screening measures, but also by an increased resistance to 
hijacking attempts on behalf of the passengers, who no longer see their chances 
for survival as high. Nevertheless, we still have seen highly lethal attacks on civil 
aviation, such as the August 2004 twin suicide bombings of passenger airliners in 
Russia that killed 89 people. This incident reminds us that no security system is 
foolproof. Besides the threat of suicide bombings or hijackings, other current 
high-priority threats include the possible use of surface-to-air missiles against 
civil airliners, as well as the potential of crude dispersal of chemical or biological 
on board passenger aircraft.
With the declining prominence of aviation terrorism, the greatest current 
threat is constituted by attacks against surface transportation: trains, stations, 
depots and buses. A softer target than aviation, surface transportation offers 
terrorists easy access and little security to penetrate. In addition, the large crowds 
of strangers at surface transportation facilities guarantee anonymity for the
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attackers and facilitate their escape. Further, analysis of more than 22,000 terrorist 
incidents since 1968 indicates that attacks on land-based transportation targets 
have the highest casualty rates of any type of terrorist attack.5 On average, attacks 
against such systems created more than two-and-a-half times the casualties per 
incident as attacks on aviation targets. In terms of fatalities, attacks on surface 
transportation are among the deadliest, ranking behind attacks on aviation and 
nearly equaling fatality rates of attacks on religious and tourist targets.6
Despite the heightened focus on ground transportation terrorism in the 
wake of London and Madrid, it must be emphasized that this threat is far from 
new. For instance, in May 1985, Sikh terrorists killed 84 people in a wave of 
attacks involving booby trapped transistor radios left on buses in New Delhi and 
three adjacent Indian states. Between 1991 and 1999 the IRA planted no less than 
81 explosive devices on British underground and railway cars, terrorizing 
commuters in the whole country. Then in 1995, Aum Shinkrikyo attempted to 
release sarin, hydrogen cyanide and botulinum toxin on subway trains or stations 
in Japanese cities on at least eight occasions, in one instance killing 12 and 
injuring 1,039. During the same year the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 
spread terror in France with a wave of bombings in the Paris metro. And finally, 
in one of the most disturbing recent trends in global terrorism, suicide bombers 
have killed scores of passengers on Israeli buses and more recently the Russian 
metro. Overall, according to a study conducted in 1996 by the Mineta 
Transportation Institute (MTI), almost a third of all terrorist activity worldwide 
since 1920 involves transportation targets.7 According to a more current study 
conducted by the Brookings Institution, between 1991 and 2001 a full 42 percent 
of terrorist strikes worldwide were directed against mass transit.8 With enhanced 
aviation security measures further decreasing chances of successful attack on 
aircraft and given the high public visibility of Madrid and London, terrorists are 
likely to rely even more on land transportation targets in the future.
Why terrorists attack transportation targets
There are several distinct reasons behind the continual increase in the proportion 
of attacks against land transportation over other targets. The first reason is the 
trends in global terrorism, which have witnessed the increasing lethality of 
individual attacks, along with the reduction in the volume of targets that are 
considered “taboo” by most terrorist groups. Because ground transportation 
provides a high concentration of people in a confined space, it creates an 
attractive mass-casualty environment; if a bomb is detonated in such a confined 
space, the blast wave has great potential for destruction. This is especially true in 
cases where the blast occurs on board trains passing underground or through 
tunnels, which create another obstruction for the blast to escape, resulting in even
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higher casualties. A clear example of this was the February 2004 attack on a train 
in Moscow, where the device carried by the suicide bomber was quite small9 but 
caused disproportionate damage, killing 42 and wounding 250, mainly because 
the blast had nowhere to escape in the tunnel. The mass casualty environment of 
public transportation is one of the key reasons why attacks against transportation 
targets have been nearly twice as lethal as terror attacks overall. Secondly, another 
key advantage is the panic-spreading universality of the city bus or metro car, 
which underscores the perception among the civil population that anyone who 
uses public transportation could become a victim of the next terror attack. Thirdly, 
a terror campaign targeting commuter transportation can deter people from 
everyday travel, having a profound economic impact on the afflicted state by 
crippling the mobility of its workforce along with scaring away potential investors 
and tourists. Fourthly, continuous attacks against such frequently used 
infrastructure such as buses or trains can severely undermine government 
authority, as with time the populace grows increasingly frustrated, eventually 
blaming the government for its inability to maintain order. Fifthly, terrorists 
prefer transportation targets because they are essentially a feature of large 
population centers, which in the terrorist’s mindset represent a strike against the 
heart of the enemy. And finally, unlike civil aviation which was the favorite terror 
target throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, ground transportation is essentially a 
soft target that provides the terrorists with almost an infinite number of options 
for operations with a high probability of success and a low level of risk. In short, 
commuter transportation is an attractive terror target, a reality that is unlikely to 
change any time soon. On the contrary, attacks against public transportation are 
becoming even more prominent than in the past, especially with the declining 
capability of terror organizations to successfully launch attacks against hard 
targets.
Threat assessment
In most basic terms, the threat assessment matrix consists of two critical factors: 
the intent of a potential perpetrator to attack a particular target, as well as the 
capability of that actor to carry out a successful attack against that target. In the 
absence of either component, an attack cannot take place. For the evaluation of 
intent one must understand the drivers in the given group’s decision-making, such 
as ideology, overall strategy, strength, leadership structure, and demonstrated 
targeting patterns. Several key questions must be answered, i.e.: How would the 
given actor benefit from an attack against the target in question? Is the target seen 
as legitimate and justifiable by the group’s ideology? How does it fit into the 
overall strategy of what the group is trying to achieve? Is the group operationally 
conservative or innovative? Does the given target fit the group’s established
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targeting pattern? If not, what are the prospects of a change occurring in the 
group’s targeting preferences? Are there any shortcomings or dangers involved in 
such a change? What is the authority of the leadership or autonomous cells to 
initiate such a change? All of these factors should be examined in the assessment 
of intent.
Similarly, in the assessment of capability, we need to look at a 
combination of several components. What types of weapons and tactics has the 
group used thus far? Are these usable in an assault on the target in question? How 
and with what prospects of success? Are there any indications of possible changes 
in the group’s established modus operandi? Does the group in question have the 
organizational practicality to infiltrate the environment in question in order to 
launch its attack? How does the given target compare to other targets in terms of 
difficulty and probability of success? All of these questions need to be taken into 
consideration in the analysis of a possible threat. The next section will explore the 
threat posed by the JI to land transportation in Singapore.
Intent
With regards to ideology, the religious nature of the organization seems to 
provide the group with an enhanced level of enemy dehumanization, which 
ultimately leads to an escalating spiral of violence and the associated inclination 
toward producing am increasingly large number of casualties. This trend seems to 
be confirmed by the operational progression JI has undergone over the past few 
years. Inspired by Darul Islam and founded with the intent of creating a regional 
Islamic government in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah originally focused its 
wrath against local targets such as the assassination attempt on the Philippine 
ambassador to Indonesia, who was injured in the explosion of a remotely 
detonated car bomb in August 2000. Three people were killed and 17 others were 
wounded in the attack. But the JI leadership’s willingness to become a public 
political organization had contributed to an ideological split within the group, 
which effectively triggered the escalation of JI tactics on behalf of the more 
radical faction under the operational command of Hambali. In December 2000, JI 
operatives conducted 38 bomb attacks throughout Indonesia targeting Christian 
churches, on the one hand maintaining the group’s targeting logic but on the other 
introducing elements of synchronization and grandiosity on a scale previously 
unknown.10 The Christmas 2000 church bombings clearly aimed for a much 
higher level of fatalities than JI has ever produced in the past, and despite the fact 
that the coordinated attack resulted in the death of “only” 19 people and injuries 
to 120 others, the modus operandi that was used in the attacks represented a 
significant shift. Further, when during the operation one of the cells encountered a 
problem with their target — the church they selected was not having a Christmas
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Eve service — it had been advised by Jabir11 to select any location such as a 
discotheque or other establishment, as long as it was either kafir (infidel) or 
Chinese. This suggestion was a good indication of where the JI elements under 
Hambali were heading. Only six days later, JI launched its first successful attack 
against transportation infrastructure in the Philippines, killing 14 people on a light 
railway train and wounding some 70 others by a series of explosions in Metro 
Manila. This attack again was a sign of an increasingly daring attempt at mass 
casualties.
The Metro Manila bombings, however, were not the first instance where JI 
planned to attack transportation infrastructure. In 1999 two members of JI’s 
Singapore cell, Mohammad Khalim bin Jaffar and Hashim bin Abbas conceived a 
plan to bomb a shuttle bus service conveying US personnel between Sembawang 
Wharf and the Yishun MRT Station. Around this time, the two men filmed 
several videos of the Yishun MRT area, which were then edited into a single 
piece and sent to Mohammad Atef, al Qaida’s operations chief to Afghanistan. 
Interestingly, in this case the targeting was hardly indiscriminate, as the attack 
was specifically aimed at U.S. military personnel. Similarly, there is no indication 
that public transportation as such was a prime target; Jaffar simply selected the 
Yishun MRT station because he lived in the area,12 and because this was the only 
place with visible American military presence that he was familiar with. As such 
the targeting for this attack was focused and discriminate, thus quite different 
from Madrid or London style attacks. Likewise, for Operation JIBRIL in which 
multiple suicide bombers were supposed to detonate truck bombs in Singapore, 
only Western or kafir targets such as embassies and government buildings were 
selected, targeting specifically what the terrorists called “white meat”, and not the 
average Singaporean. This is another indication that public transportation might 
not have been an ideal target for the Singapore cell at that particular time, as the 
overwhelming majority of passengers who use the system are average 
Singaporeans, which the group was perhaps willing to sacrifice as a part of 
collateral damage, but did not have the intent to specifically target. And while this 
may be a subtle distinction, it does provide a critical insight into JI’s target 
selection logic. At the same time, the avoidance of Singaporean casualties is 
likely associated with the fact that the perpetrators themselves were Singaporean, 
suggesting that another cell that would be sent from another country to carry out 
attacks in Singapore might not share such a sentiment. This again underscores the 
fluidity of internal logic within terrorist organizations, which forces us to 
approach the issue of threat assessment from a non-static frame of reference.
After the failure of Operation JIBRIL due to the swift arrests of the 
Singapore cell’s members in December 2001, yet another important shift in JI’s 
targeting preferences took place. Under pressure to deliver a strike that would 
finally succeed, at the next meeting held in January 2002 in Thailand Hambali
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called for a revision of targeting procedures to focus on “soft targets” associated 
with the West, such as night, clubs, bars and hotels.13 The shift from hard 
government targets to soft tourist targets represents a significant escalatory 
progression -  due partly to the difficulty of successfully attacking heavily 
protected government targets, the terrorists now started considering innocent 
civilians to be a guilty party in the conflict, regressing their attribution of guilt to 
the lowest possible common denominator: anyone but themselves and their co­
conspirators. Indeed, Hambali reportedly distributed bin Laden’s fatwa 
advocating precisely this targeting logic among the operatives of the Bali attack.14 
In the bin Laden text, anyone who supports the infidel governments by paying 
taxes is declared guilty of the resulting oppression of Muslims, and therefore a 
legitimate target. At the same time, even in the upcoming attacks the target 
selection still focused primarily on attaining American casualties.15
On October 12, 2002, a man detonated a suicide belt in the Patty’s Bar in 
Bali. As people fled out onto the street in panic, another suicide bomber detonated 
a van loaded with nearly 1000 kg of explosives in the middle of the quickly 
forming crowd. According to one of the terrorists, the bomb weighed 1000 
kilograms as a symbolic payback for the one-ton bombs America dropped on 
Muslims in the Middle East.16 The attack represented the first use of suicide 
bombers in Southeast Asia, and followed a signature al Qaida modus operandi of 
a synchronized attack against multiple targets. Only nine months after the Bali 
attack, suicide terror would reach the Indonesian capitol, when on August 5th,
2003, a car bomb exploded outside the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 12 
people and wounding 150 others. The link between the two attacks was 
immediately obvious. As in the Bali bombing, the perpetrators in Jakarta used the 
same kind of explosives, as well as mobile phones for the purposes of remote 
detonation. Another thirteen months later, on September 9, 2004, a nearly 
identical suicide truck bombing took place at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 
killing 10 people and injuring more than 180 others. The attack was a clear 
demonstration of the fact that despite the apprehension of Hambali in February
2004, the pro- al Qaida wing in the JI was still a potent force. Just in case there 
was any doubt, on October 1, 2005, three suicide bombers detonated their belts at 
the seaside area of Jimbaran Bay and the bar and shopping hub of Kuta, killing 23 
people and wounding 102 more.
The above chronology carries several important lessons and implications. 
The first implication stems from the JI ideology, which at least in the 
interpretation of the more radical wing provides an environment that favors 
operations that can maximize damage and casualties. In this light, the mass 
casualty favorable environment of transportation systems provides a logical target 
for the group to attack. Secondly, JI’s larger goal of establishing a Muslim state in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and southern Philippines nominates
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Singapore as a natural target, as demonstrated by the various disrupted plots 
targeting the city state. Thirdly, following the failure to launch attacks against 
hard targets in Singapore and the Philippines, JI’s targeting pattern has witnessed 
the shift toward soft targets such as hotels, bars and clubs frequented by western 
tourists. The Bali bombing was the evidence of first such attack, followed by the 
J.W. Marriot bombing. Having grown increasingly confident after these two 
operations, key operatives of the JI radical wing, Noodrin Mohammed Top and Dr 
Azhari decided to once again attempt striking a hard target, choosing the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta. However, the attack could hardly be considered a 
success by any standard, as all of the 11 casualties were Indonesian Muslims, 
sparking a wave of popular resentment against the perpetrators. As a result, the 
group switched back to attacking soft targets with the second Bali bombings. This 
suggests that land transportation targets, which are “soft” by definition, are well 
within JI targeting scope. And while JI has yet to perpetrate attacks that would be 
completely indiscriminate in the sense that they would also deliberately target 
Muslims, attacking land transportation in a setting where non-Muslims provide 
the majority of passengers would certainly be ideologically acceptable, if not 
desirable. Singapore, Philippines and Thailand provide such a setting. Not 
coincidentally, have all three countries been targets in transportation attacks in the 
past.
Capability
Terrorist organizations generate various fantastical ideas and attack plans. Their 
ability to translate those plans into action, however, is very much constrained by 
the operational capability of the given group. Having established the logic for JI’s 
selection of Singapore’s land transportation system as a target, let us now focus 
on JI capabilities and operational skills, in order to assess the likelihood of a 
successful attack being launched as well as the probable modus operandi that such 
an operation is likely to employ.
JI’s tactical repertoire is a relatively modest one, at least when comparing 
to other major contemporary terrorist organizations. Virtually all of the group’s 
operations have involved the use explosive devices, detonated either remotely or 
by suicide bombers. JI has never engaged in shooting attacks, barricade hostage or 
kidnapping incidents, sabotage, or more exotic means of attack such as the 
dispersal of chemical or biological agents. Even in the area of explosive devices JI 
has been rather conservative, settling for the design that has worked in the past 
accompanied by minor incremental improvements over time.17 These 
improvements were essentially the result of a “learning from failure” approach. 
For instance, during the 2000 Christmas church bombings the explosive devices 
were made out of carbon, potassium, sulfur and TNT,18 wrapped in gift paper and
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rigged to mobile phones for remote detonation. In this case however, a number of 
the bombs malfunctioned, either failing to detonate completely or detonating at 
the wrong time. This has resulted in the death of several JI operatives including 
Hambali’s close friend Jabir, who forgot to change his SIM card and died in an 
explosion triggered by an unexpected phone call. JI bomb makers reviewed their 
mistakes and during the next major attack in Bali, not only were the destructive 
effects of the large bomb enhanced by packing the delivery vehicle with a dozen 
plastic filing cabinets filled with a mix of explosive materials; the device was also 
rigged with four separate detonation mechanisms (remote, timing, manual and 
anti-handling mechanism) to ensure that it would detonate as planned.19 The 1000 
kg bomb, although only 30 percent efficient,20 produced a large enough explosion 
and subsequent fire to kill an overall number 202 of people, marking the deadliest 
attack since 9-11 and the 8th deadliest attack in the history of terrorism. According 
to interrogation reports, the Bali terrorists originally planned for an even greater 
carnage, by incorporating a third suicide bomber who was supposed to ride a 
motorcycle through the doors of the packed Sari Club and detonate himself. The 
plan was abandoned only after it was discovered the man chosen for the suicide 
task could not ride a motorcycle 21
The explosive device used in the bombing of the J.W. Marriot in Jakarta 
was identical to the one used in Bali, and although it was considerably smaller 
consisting of six plastic boxes weighing 19 kilograms each,22 it was still clear the 
attack was aimed to create as many casualties as possible. In order to increase 
lethality, the terrorists attached dozens of bars of laundry soap to containers of 
inflammable liquid which were placed next to the bomb. The mixture of sodium 
and fatty acids in the soap helped create fireballs which engulfed some of the 
victims. According to investigators, the bomb was personally detonated via a 
mobile phone by Dr. Azhari bin Husin, JI’s top bomb maker who escaped from 
the scene on the back of a motorcycle. The explosion produced a two-meter wide 
crater, penetrating through 32-centimeter thick concrete into the basement, and 
the suicide bomber’s head was catapulted all the way to the hotel’s 5th floor. As 
earlier in Bali, also in this attack the perpetrators tried to prevent easy 
identification by attempting to scrape off the identification numbers on the 
vehicles used so they would not be easily traceable to the original owner23 
However, in both of these cases as well as in the case of the Australian embassy 
bombing, the Indonesian authorities were still able to recover and reconstruct the 
registration number from the debris, leading to the arrest of many of the JI 
members involved in the bombings.24 This fact, along with the failure to achieve 
significant damage to the Australian Embassy due to anti-vehicle barriers installed 
in front of the building, apparently led to a change in JI’s bombing approach. 
Instead of using trucks packed with explosives which had trouble approaching 
their targets, the group adopted the use suicide backpacks, which would not only
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be more difficult to trace, but could also be more successful in reaching the 
desired target. Such devices were not only used in the second Bali bombing, but 
were also recovered from the hideouts of Dr. Azhari during his elimination in 
Malang in November 2005, and even more importantly, in the safe house of 
Noordin Mohammed Top during the unsuccessful apprehension attempt in 
Wonosobo in May 2006.25 Especially the Wonosobo discovery is significant, as it 
demonstrates JI’s ability to construct these explosive devices even after the 
demise Azhari, the group’s chief bomb maker.
With regards to other potential tactics that could be used by JI, we also 
need to mention chemical and biological agents, especially in the light of the Aum 
Shinrikyo experience in Japan and the October 2003 discovery of a chemical and 
biological weapons manual in the apartment of top JI operative Taufiq Rifqi in 
Cotabato City southern Mindanao.26 This manual provides useful insights into the 
CBW capability of the group.27 On the one hand, the document surveys several 
agents of disturbing potency and expresses considerable optimism and fascination 
with regard to how miniscule amounts of the respective agent are needed to kill a 
large number of people. On the other hand, the manual hints a complete lack of 
knowledge with regards to efficient delivery of the produced agents. The manual 
covers a number of chemical gases, pesticides and even narcotics, as well as 
biological toxins. All of the agents are discussed in a uniform structural manner, 
describing the materials and the procedures needed for the production of the given 
agent, expected effects, dosage, experimental results, and in some cases, delivery 
methods. With regards to the scope of the chemical agents listed, in is noteworthy 
that with the exception of phosgene, one of the gases that were developed and 
used for assassination purposes by the Aum Shinrikyo, none of the listed 
substances can be accurately described as warfare agents. The chemical 
substances covered in the manual include hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide, 
phosgene, chlorine, and arsenic, which are described in some detail. The manual 
also discusses various less threatening or completely unusable agents such as 
potassium ferrocyanide, potassium permanganate, chloroform, aniline, as well as 
a number of narcotics including cocaine, heroin and morphine. These agents are 
discussed in less detail, skipping the information on composition, manufacture 
and weaponization. Hydrogen cyanide, the blood agent that was used in the Nazi 
gas chambers under the name Cyclone-B, is the one substance that is covered in 
most detail. The manual also spends a considerable amount of space on describing 
two “firing devices” for this agent, one of which utilizes a close up release 
consisting of a mechanical break of a glass plate separating the binary 
components, triggering their mixture and immediate release. The other firing 
device then relies on the use of a table tennis ball as a delay mechanism. In this 
scenario the ball injected with sulfuric acid is placed into an open container filled 
with potassium or sodium cyanide, relying on the acid to eat through the plastic in
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order to combine with the other ingredient. Having described the production and 
delivery, the manual moves on to prescribing ideal targets, focusing mainly on 
buildings that are air-conditioned in order to “achieve a more rapid spread of the 
gas”. Overall, the chemical weapons section of the manual discusses fairly 
accurately the production of several highly potent agents that theoretically could 
cause the death of a large number of people. At the same time, only agents the 
production of which is about as challenging as the mixing of a lime juice are 
considered in further detail -  the manual completely omits the category of nerve 
agents, which are the most potent but also most difficult to produce.
In the category of biological agents, the JI manual focuses only on toxins 
(poisons produced by living organisms) such as botulinum toxin, nicotine, toxins 
from poisonous mushrooms and potato buds. In terms of agent selection, only 
substances that can be easily produced from conventional materials such as 
cigarettes, potatoes, castor beans, mushrooms, or meat are considered. The 
described production methods are fairly accurate, but the problem with JI’s 
biological weapons knowledge is the complete lack of mass-casualty capable 
delivery systems. Noteworthy in this respect is the complete absence of 
contagious agents that could theoretically be delivered by a human carrier via 
secondary transmission. The non-inclusion of contagious agents is by no means a 
surprise -  the lack of control over the outcome of the attack makes them highly 
unattractive for terrorist purposes, unless of course the perpetrators desire to kill 
everyone including themselves, their constituency and even their own family 
members.
With regards to the threat to land transportation terrorism, the manual is 
interesting in that it references Aum Shinrikyo’s tactics in targeting Tokyo trains. 
In the discussion about hydrogen cyanide, the manual states: “[the agent] was 
used in a Japanese railway several years ago killing a number of people”.28 This 
statement, however appears to be highly inaccurate, as it apparently refers to the 
Tokyo subway gassings, which employed the nerve agent sarin, and not hydrogen 
cyanide. Another possibility is that the citation refers to the 5 May 1995 incident 
in the bathroom of the Shinjuku subway station, where two plastic bags 
containing 1.5 liters of diluted sulfuric acid and 2 liters of powdered sodium 
cyanide, respectively, were found on fire. The objective of the attack that was 
ascribed to the Aum Shinrikyo was the production of hydrogen cyanide with the 
hope that the air-conditioning system would suck in the gas, dispersing it over the 
platform.29 The attack however failed to impact anyone, as have the three 
duplicate attempts that took place later during the same year. As a result, the 
vague reference in the JI manual is ultimately incorrect, which is significant given 
the common tendency of analysts to assume that terrorist organizations routinely 
learn from each other. While there are historical instances where organizations 
have indeed studied the operations conducted by other groups in order to learn
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from them, the JI manual example clearly shows the inability or unwillingness of 
this group to do the same. This is evident not only in the area of chemical agents, 
but also in the earlier discussed example of JI’s explosive devices.
Analysis
JI has in recent years experienced an internal split. The principal organizers behind 
the main attacks in Indonesia have been two Malaysians, Dr. Azhari and Noordin 
Mohammed Top, both members of the more radical pro-al Qaida faction within the 
JI, which according to a former key JI operative Nasir Abbas, who “[sees itself] as 
fighting a new world battle. ... They say, we can attack civilians anywhere, just as 
Americans attack Muslim civilians all over the world”.30 This view is in sharp 
contrast with the JI core, whose actions and objectives are very much local in 
nature. It is this faction that has shown the desire to launch attacks consistent with 
al Qaida targeting guidelines and using the signature modus operandi of multiple 
synchronized suicide attacks against high profile targets. An attack against the 
transportation system in Singapore, especially following the precedents set by 
Madrid and London, would certainly be consistent with the group’s preferences. 
Further, this group has planned attacks in Singapore in the past, has a history of 
targeting commuter transportation, and appears to be further progressing to soft 
targets. As a result the motivation to attack public transportation in Singapore is 
not in question. At the same time, this appears be too ambitious of a plan for the 
group in its current state. Following the elimination of Dr. Azhari in November 
2005, the immediate capability of the group has certainly decreased. Yes, it is true 
that given the codification of Azhari’s knowledge in JI bomb making manuals and 
the presence of Noordin Mohammed Top, another key operative who is still at 
large, JI’s ability to launch further suicide operations had not yet been eliminated 
completely. But while it may be safe to assume that we may see more suicide 
attacks in Indonesia, JI’s reach currently does not appear to go past the borders of 
that country, at least as far as operations are concerned. This is especially true if 
we consider Singapore as a target, as the city state has more stringent border 
controls in place than most other countries in the region and provides many other 
barriers and security measures that would make a possible attack highly 
challenging. For instance, even if JI operatives were to overcome the immigration 
obstacle and succeed in infiltrating Singapore, significant obstacles in obtaining 
the necessary precursor materials to build explosive devices for the attack would 
still exist. These problems alone are likely to convince JI to focus on other, more 
feasible targets.
Is this a reality that could suddenly change? History tells us that terrorist 
organizations rarely alter their established modus operandi, and when they do, 
these changes are driven by very specific reasons.31 The first such reason comes in
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the event of an introduction of government countermeasures, such as target 
hardening efforts that serve as a direct obstruction to the tactics used by terrorists 
in the past. While most groups can be expected to yield to this pressure and 
substitute targets, an innovative organization will refuse go down this path of least 
resistance in order to increase its probability of success. Instead, such a group will 
work to overcome these countermeasures by means that have not been accounted 
for by the enemy, often placing an emphasis on projecting an image of invincibility 
as well as mocking the state for failing to stop the attack despite all of its 
resources. This is not a profile that would fit the JI in the current state. The group 
has responded to government countermeasures in the past precisely in a regressive 
fashion, by refocusing their target preferences to less challenging targets such as 
tourist spots, wile making only minor incremental improvements along the way. 
This suggests that a shift toward hardened targets such as Singaporean MRT32 does 
not fit the group’s operational profile. To date, JI has been able to launch only one 
attack per year, and all of the attacks in recent years have targeted soft targets in 
Indonesia where the group finds it much easier to prepare and execute.
Another scenario in which a group can be expected to alter its operational 
methods in a novel direction comes in the presence of an inherent ideological pre­
determination toward using certain technologies or the need to innovate in order to 
obtain the capability to match the level of violence associated with the respective 
ideological and strategic preferences.33 This is not the case of JI at this moment; 
Azhari whose personal technological zeal was one of he major drivers of the 
incremental improvements in explosive devices is no longer available, and the 
group is dependent on the codification of his knowledge via various manuals and 
past training. For this reason, it is highly unlikely that JI’s modus operandi will 
change because of ideological or strategic reasons, especially given the limited 
resources and capability of the group.
The third relevant scenario of a trigger to terrorist adaptation of new 
operational methods is an incidental or unintended acquisition of a particular 
human or material resource. This is a real threat. If, for instance, a Singaporean JI 
cell offered to facilitate a feasible plot against the transportation system in 
Singapore, it is quite possible that JI may lend its expertise and resources toward 
this end. The current trends in terrorism suggest that the greatest threat is posed by 
homegrown groups which although inspired by al Qaida ideology, do not bear any 
visible links to the network. As we have seen in virtually all attacks attributed to 
the al Qaida after 9-11,34 they have been carried out by either ad-hoc groups, or 
operatives who were at home in the country where the attack took place. This has 
significant implications, as launching an operation from abroad requires much 
more resources, planning and expertise while also exposing the conspirators to 
great level of risk. JI presently does not have this capability. However, the 
facilitation of this process by a local cell, which is familiar with the targets and the
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system and does not need to worry when crossing borders, would make the 
execution of such an attack much more feasible. Although still quite low in 
probability due to extensive intelligence efforts within Singapore, this homegrown 
group scenario is by far the greatest terrorist threat facing the country’s public 
transportation system today.
While the terrorism threat has received the most attention, we should be 
aware that other scenarios exist as well, namely the possibility of an attack by 
individuals or small groups without a political agenda, such as financial gain or 
psychological idiosyncrasy. The most probable scenario in this regard is a 
deranged individual along the lines of Colin Ferguson, who in December 1993 
began firing randomly at passengers traveling from New York on a crowded Long 
Island Rail Road train during rush hour. Ferguson, who was finally overpowered 
by passengers while reloading, killed six passengers and wounded 17 others. 
Other examples include Edward Leary, who in December 1994 detonated two 
gasoline bombs on subway trains injuring 48 people,36 or a Korean man who 
burned 192 persons to death during his February 2003 suicide attempt on the Seoul 
subway.37 These incidents serve as a reminder that not always is the perpetrator’s 
intent a predictable variable.
In the case of criminal motivation, such attacks are unlikely in Singapore 
due to the overall very low level of criminality in the country, strong punishments 
for criminal offenses, small number of possible escape routes and the lack of 
precedents for successful negotiations on behalf of attackers when it comes to 
achieving concessions in hostage situations such as free passage. Robbing a train 
or holding hostages on a bus for ransom is simply not a good proposition for any 
criminal in Singapore. In contrast, a deranged or suicidal individual’s motivation 
and intent is much more difficult to predict. And while obtaining a firearm in 
Singapore is very difficult, we should not forget the above mentioned Seoul 
subway tragedy, in which easy to acquire technology requiring only about a $3 
dollar investment was used to kill hundreds (a paper milk container filled with 
gasoline and a cigarette lighter). This example shows that an attack does not need 
to be particularly sophisticated to cause significant damage.
Another low-cost means to disrupt the transportation system are hoaxes, 
which can at a time of heightened threat level or in the aftermath of high profile 
attacks, cause a considerable headache. For instance, in Atlanta during the 
Olympic Games, the local MARTA transportation system experienced more than 
140 suspicious packages in the wake of the Centennial Park incident.38 Similarly, 
in the U.K. between 1991 and 1997, there were 6,569 telephone bomb threats 
concerning transportation targets and 9,430 suspicious objects were reported and 
investigated.39 Hoaxes can be a considerable problem as they can cause the 
disruption of service, spread of fear and economic damage by the need to respond 
to them. However, they tend to work “best” in places where actual attacks have
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happened, and authorities thus cannot afford to ignore any type of threat. In the UK 
experience, no unattended bag was ever linked to an explosive device, but due to 
the fact that real bombing happened frequently enough every unattended bag had 
to be checked.40
Countermeasures
Contrary to popular perception, when compared to other major cites in the world, 
the threat to Singapore’s transportation system is rather low. At the same time, the 
same could have also been said about the Tokyo metro system in March 1995, just 
before the sarin attacks. This fact underscores the dilemma faced by decision 
makers and security managers. If no real immediate threat exists, and yet nothing 
can ever be ruled out, how much security is enough? Is a specific real time terrorist 
threat the only way to gather together enough security, or should public agencies 
take action to prevent such a threat?41 Given the fact that there are never enough 
resources to address all possible threats, striking the right balance is always a 
difficult task. Singapore is no exception, although the city’s size, availability of 
resources and a generally high level of perceived threat have resulted in the 
implementation of more security measures than one might expect.
There are a number of reasons why terrorism has become such a high 
priority item on the government agenda in the last few years. Besides the now 
disrupted existence of JI cells with concrete attacks plans in the country, 
Singapore’s specific circumstances result in a perception of high vulnerability. The 
first reason is the small size of the country and herewith associated lack of 
“strategic depth”, as well as its economic dependence on the confidence of foreign 
investors, which might be disrupted in the event of a terror attack. Also important 
is the overall high level of security in the country, which besides its positive 
deterrent function also results in higher level of complacency among the general 
population, as well as a heightened psychological vulnerability toward the feeling 
of insecurity which is likely to occur in the aftermath of a possible attack. 
Similarly, the city-state’s highly multicultural population has a questionable 
resilience to a terrorist campaign, and should a terror attack be perpetrated by 
people form within Singapore’s minority communities, intercultural harmony in 
Singapore could be jeopardized. Combined with the perception of being a “prize” 
target for terrorists in Southeast Asia due to its pro Western political position and 
economic success, the attention and resources devoted to defensive strategy against 
terrorism in Singapore is unusually high.
An essential part of this strategy is the protection of Singapore’s public 
transportation infrastructure, which includes primarily bus and rail systems. The 
bus service operated by two companies, SBS transit and SMRT corporation, 
provides a combined total of 3395 vehicles on 261 routes, totaling over 3 million
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passenger trips daily. The system also features 109 km of the so-called Mass 
Rapid Transit (MRT) with 3 lines and 67 stations, 1.3 million daily passenger 
trips. A new 34 km Circle Line is under construction and will be opened in phases 
as the various stations are ready. In addition to the MRT, the train system also 
features three lines of the Light Rapid Transit (LRT) system and 38.6 km of train 
tracks and one rail's terminal at Tanjong Pagar Railway Station which serves 
trains to Malaysia.42 Given the fact that Singapore is a small city state, it has one 
of the most dense ground transportation networks of all countries in the world.
In principle, land transportation security has two objectives: not only the 
prevention of casualties, but also the minimization of disruption of service. The 
elimination of casualties relies heavily on preventing an attack in the first place 
via deterrent and protective measures, but also on mitigation via swift and 
efficient medical response. The disruption of service and herewith associated 
economic costs relies on good inter-agency communication a well as planning or 
providing alternative means of transport for commuters, as well as contingency 
plans for restoration of regular service. An excellent analytical study by the 
Mineta Institute in California in 1997 has compared the lessons learned from 
attacks on public transportation systems in the U.K. France, Japan, and the United 
States, and identified the best practices in responding to the threat of public 
transportation terror. 43 Many of these measures have been adopted in Singapore 
particularly in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid bombings.
As a part of this effort, many security measures have been implemented on 
trains and stations such as abundant presence of CCTV cameras at platforms. In 
addition a plan was announced to fit MRT trains with CCTV cameras, as well as 
the mounting of GPS systems on buses in order to achieve the ability to quickly 
pinpoint their exact location. Such measures are meant to not only serve as a tool 
for monitoring possible threats and incursions and to aid response teams by 
exactly identifying the current conditions inside impacted vehicles, but also as a 
deterrent function aiming to undermine the confidence of potential attackers that 
their attack plan will succeed. The British experience from the IRA camping in 
early 1990s provides a good example. In 1991, IRA terrorist attacks centered on 
stations in London. By 1992, following the adoption of highly visible CCTV 
cameras, intrusion alarms and other security measures, the attackers were pushed 
out to suburban stations, and by 1993, they were confined to home counties. The 
targets of the attackers also shifted from stations to switch boxes and rail lines
/> • 44away from stations.
Another measure that has been identified as highly productive was the 
adaptation of an environmental design of transportation stations that would 
eliminate potential hiding places for bombs. In Singapore, this step was 
represented by the removal of trash bins and mail boxes from platforms and 
concourse levels to the main station entrances. Given the fact that the platforms
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are well lit and monitored, this measure has virtually eliminated potential hiding 
places. Another step that has been used in countries experiencing terrorist 
campaigns has been the deployment of bomb resistant trash containers to 
eliminate fragmentation effects of a possible explosion, but such a measure would 
represent overkill in the Singapore context considering the comparatively low 
level of threat.
The next practice identified in the examined case studies as highly 
effective was the augmentation of visible security personnel in periods of 
immediate threat to deter potential attackers, or following major crises, in order to 
mitigate the psychological impact and restore a perception of security among 
commuters. This model was followed after Madrid by the deployment of private 
unarmed guards to patrol the station platforms, with the authority to check the 
belongings of customers. In addition, following the London attacks, the Singapore 
police also deployed armed Police Tactical Unit officers to patrol within stations 
the day after the bombings occurred, while pre-existing security measures were 
placed on higher alert. These armed officers began visible patrols on the MRT and 
LRT systems, conducting random patrols in pairs in and around rail stations and 
within trains. Selected with their height and physique in mind to project a tougher 
presence, these officers are trained and authorized to utilize their firearms based 
on the officers' discretion, including “shoot to kill” if  deemed necessary.45 This 
fact was, of course, widely publicized in order to achieve maximum deterrent 
effect.
The next area identified among the best practices for protecting commuter 
transportation is the involvement of the public, particularly in the area of boosting 
vigilance and encouraging the prompt reporting of unattended luggage and 
suspicious packages, in order to increase the likelihood that a potential explosive 
device left behind in a train or bus is discovered and disarmed before it can be 
detonated. This campaign has featured periodical public announcements on 
platforms and trains, as well as the distribution of ever-present posters 
encouraging passengers to report any suspicious activity or unattended luggage.
The one area identified as all important has been training, coordination 
and testing of response capability though simulated exercises. Such exercises are 
particularly useful in uncovering flaws in the system and advancing readiness, as 
well as serving to reassure the public that a response capability exists. In 
Singapore, exercises are also designed to serve a deterrent function by trying to 
demonstrate to potential perpetrators that a robust response capability is present to 
minimize the chances of success of any potential attack. This is one of the 
reasons why simulation exercises in Singapore tend to respond to highly fantastic 
and challenging threats, as in the case of the three hour Exercise NorthStar V, 
which took place on 8 January 2006. This exercise, the largest of its kind in the 
history of Singapore, simulated near simultaneous suicide bombings followed by
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a chemical attack on four MRT stations and one bus interchange. Northstar V 
involved a total 22 agencies and 2,000 emergency personnel. Services at 13 MRT 
stations were temporarily disrupted and roads within the vicinity were also closed 
to traffic, affecting about 3,400 commuters. Shuttle buses were used to ferry 
commuters affected by the exercise. Thunderflashes, smoke generators, and fire 
simulators were used to simulate the explosion and 500 simulated casualties were 
deployed to test emergency rescuers at the scene. These mock casualties carried 
tags to provide paramedics information on the extent of their injuries and these 
includes injuries related to bomb blasts, such as open wounds and burns. There 
were also some with injuries related to sarin, and 28 casualties underwent 
decontamination before being treated. Besides clinical readiness, the drill also 
tested how hospital operations and information were coordinated and total of 
1,280 hospital workers from seven hospitals and two polyclinics were involved in 
the drill.46 Further such exercises are planned for the near future.
Conclusion
Analysis of JI’s targeting pattern reveals an increasing preference for soft, 
Western, mass-casualty targets in Southeast Asia. Singapore’s commuter 
transportation system fully encompasses all of these adjectives, and is thus a 
natural target. But although a “soft” target by definition, the Singapore public 
transportation system appears to be too “hard” for the JI to attack at present, 
precisely because it is located in Singapore. So, while JI might very well be 
motivated to launch an attack against the system, it currently possesses only very 
limited capability to do so successfully. For the time being, the group’s operations 
are likely to take the form of synchronized suicide bombings against soft targets 
in Indonesia. If the land transportation system in Singapore is in fact to be 
attacked in the future, this will likely involve an explosive or arson attack by a 
homegrown cell that will conduct the attacks either independently by acquiring 
necessary know how and guidance via the internet, or with the help from an 
ideologically affiliated group with better resources and expertise. Other scenarios 
include attacks by deranged individuals along the lines of the Seoul suicide, or the 
disruption of service a wave of hoaxes by pranksters or sympathizers.
Despite the relatively low level of threat, Singapore has made many 
preparations and preventive measures that other countries that have experienced 
surface transportation terrorism have identified as pillars of effective public 
transportation security. And yet, the system still has visible holes and weaknesses 
that could be exploited by potential attackers. This has, particularly in the wake 
off the Madrid bombings, led to many suggestions on how to strengthen the 
security system, essentially mimicking the measures that have gradually been 
implemented over the past 30 years in the effort to strengthen the security of civil
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aviation. These have consisted mainly of the installation of metal detectors, x-rays 
and vapor detectors, the securing of perimeter fences around airports, the 
deterrent presence of armed guards, sentry dogs, etc. After London, the debate has 
gone as far as suggestions to introduce remote signal jammers in metro systems in 
order to eliminate the possibility of remote detonation of explosives on trains. 
Ironically, such measures could not have been effective in preventing even 
Madrid, where the alarm clock function that does not require a signal was used for 
detonations, nor London itself, where suicide bombers were present to detonate 
their devices manually.
It is clear that most of the proposed measures are not an option for 
securing ground transportation targets such as buses and MRT lines, for several 
reasons. Firstly, the sheer number of bus and train stops at which potential 
attackers could board is incomparably higher than the number of gates at airports, 
making the implementation of even relatively basic screening procedures for 
ground transportation an extremely expensive proposition. Secondly, while 
compulsory airport taxes paid by each passenger can aid in financing the security 
of civil aviation, the low cost of a bus or metro ride make the duplication of such 
efforts for ground transportation just about impossible. Thirdly, the idea of 
everyday commute being prolonged by up to an hour due to queues forming at 
screening stations would hardly be acceptable for the majority of the population. 
And finally, even if all of the above obstacles were somehow overcome, the ease 
of causing massive destruction with dual use items makes the prospects of 
successfully averting acts of terror uncertain. Clearly, no system is perfect and 
no matter what measures are eventually put into place, the public will inevitably 
have to accept a significant level of risk. The above mentioned experiences of 
countries that have been affected by deadly waves of ground transportation terror 
provide us with useful lessons we can build upon. In this sense, it has always been 
a combination of several measures that has helped the authorities to cope with the 
threat. On the prevention side, it has been the deterrent presence of armed guards 
and dogs at critical interchanges, the high level of awareness and bravery of 
surface transportation staff, and the heightened vigilance of the public, that had 
succeeded in thwarting a large number of terrorist attacks. No less important has 
been the role of effective response and timely mitigation once attacks actually did 
occur. Fast and efficient medical response saves lives, effective forensics 
procedures can aid to timely identification and apprehension of the perpetrators, 
and returning the people’s lives back to normal as soon as possible helps in 
thwarting the effects of terror.
The one often neglected but in reality crucial aspect of effectively 
countering transportation terror is psychological defense. Terrorism is essentially 
a psychological mind game the objective of which is to create the universal 
perception of vulnerability that is largely disproportionate to the actual level of
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the threat. From a terrorist’s strategic perspective, the killings itself are secondary 
to the spread of panic. It is thus crucial to recognize that by living in fear and 
uncertainty we help satisfy the terrorists’ key objective. This is not to suggest that 
we should not take all reasonable preventive measures to improve our security, 
but it would be foolish to think that we can ever fully eliminate all of the weak 
spots of soft targets such as ground transportation. The population must 
understand that no system is perfect, and that no matter what steps are taken, 
public transportation will still remain a feasible target. Terrorists will always find 
ways to attack it. Reassuring the public that measures to combat the threat are in 
place, while also preparing it for the possibility that an attack might happen, 
provides the right combination of measures.
1 Excluding the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland
2 Enders, Walter, Sandler, Todd, Cauley, Jon, “U.N. Conventions Technology and Retaliation in 
the Fight Against Terrorism: an Econometric Evaluation,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
(1990) Vol.2 No. 2
3 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do 
Now?” (2003) The Lexington Institute
4 Hoffman, Bruce, “Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities.” Terrorism and 
Political Violence (1993) Vol.5 No. 2, p. 12
5 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do 
Now?” (2003) The Lexington Institute
6 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Improving Public Surface Transportation Security: What Do We Do 
Now?” (2003) The Lexington Institute
7 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist 
Activities.” (1997) Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy 
Studies, IISTPS Report 97-4, Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of 
Attacks.
8 Holt, Andrew, “Al-Qaeda and the Threat to Mass Surface Transportation” (2004) Jamestown 
Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume IV. No. 9.
9 between 2.5 - 5 kg of TNT
10 Ressa, Maria A., The Seeds o f  Terror (2003) Free Press, New York, p. 103
11 Jabir, whose real name is Enjang Bastaman, was the close friend of Hambali. Both were fellow 
Afghan veterans who had also been associates in Malaysia.
12 Ressa, Maria A., The Seeds o f  Terror (2003) Free Press, New York, p. 155
13 Ressa, Maria A., The Seeds o f  Terror (2003) Free Press, New York, p. 182
14 Associated Press: Bali bombing link to bin Laden claimed. (April 3,2004) Internet, available 
at:http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/02/l 080544691681 .html?from=storvrhs (accessed on 
6/6/2004)
15 Although the majority of victims in Bali were Australians, interrogation reports reveal that the 
group planned to target American sailors; their ship however left earlier than expected.
16 Miller, Wayne, “Bali attack delayed a day, mastermind reveals,” The Age, (July 5,2003)
17 Baker, John C., “Jemaah Islamyia” in Jackson, Brian, et. al, Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: 
Case Studies o f  Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups. (2005) RAND, Santa Monica, 
p. 74
18 Ressa, Maria A., The Seeds o f  Terror (2003) Free Press, New York, p. 102
Dolnik: Terrorist Threat to Singapore's Transportation Infrastructure 21
19 Ressa, Maria A., The Seeds o f  Terror (2003) Free Press, New York, 186-187
20 Australian investigators calculated that only about 30 percent of the chemical mixture exploded, 
the rest simply burned
21 Wockner, Cindy, “Third suicide bomber planned,” The Advertiser, (July 23, 2003)
22 Harsanto, Damar, “Reenactment traces bomb assembly,” The Jakarta Post, (December 10, 
2003)
23 CBS News: “Jakarta Bomber: Qaeda Group Link” (August 8, 2003). Internet. Available at: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/15/attack/main568452.shtml (accessed on 9/10/04)
24 Baker, John C., “Jemaah Islamyia” in Jackson, Brian, et. al, Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: 
Case Studies o f  Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups. (2005) RAND, Santa Monica, 
p. 84
25 Stratfor: “Indonesia: Missing a Chance at a 'Top' Militant.” Stratfor Daily Terrorism Brief 
(May 1,2006)
26 Sunstar: “Bio-weapons traces found in JI hideout” (October 21, 2003) Internet, available at: 
http://www.snnstar.com.ph/static/net/2003/10/21/bio.weapons.traces.found.in.ii.hideout.html 
(accessed on 05/12/06)
27 Dolnik Adam and Gunaratna, Rohan, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Terrorism.” in Howard, Russell D. and Forest, James J.F. (eds.) Terrorism 
and Weapons o f  Mass Destruction (2007) McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 280
28 Dolnik Adam and Gunaratna, Rohan, “Jemaah Islamiyah and the Threat of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Terrorism.” in Howard, Russell D. and Forest, James J.F. (eds.) Terrorism 
and Weapons o f  Mass Destruction (2007) McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 287
29 Center for Nonproliferation Studies: “Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities,” (2001) 
Internet, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/aum chm.htm. (accessed on 12/12/02)
30 McDowell, Robin, “Indonesians ask why fellow Muslims are turning to suicide bombings.” 
Associated Press (December 4, 2005)
31 Dolnik, Adam, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends 
(2007) Routledge, London, p. 173
32 MRT is by definition a soft target, but given its location in Singapore, it certainly represents a 
much harder target than a restaurant in Indonesia.
33 Dolnik, Adam, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends 
(2007) Routledge, London, p. 175
34 An exception to this are suicide bombings in active conflict zones such as Iraq, and the 
November 2005 bombing in Amman, which included an Iraqi husband and wife who infiltrated 
Jordan to blow themselves up in the Radisson Hotel.
35 Boyd, Annabelle and Sullivan, John P., “Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism,” 
(1997) TCRP Synthesis of Transit Practice 27, Transportation Research Board, National Research 
Council. Available at http://nationalacademies.org/trb/publications/tcrp/tsvn27.pdf (accessed on 
05/06/06)
36 Jenkins, Brian and Gersten, Larry N., “Protecting Public Surface Transportation against 
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices,” (2001) Mineta 
Transportation Institute.
37 CBS News: “Arson Attack on S. Korean Subway”. Internet, available at:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/18/world/main540957.shtml (accessed on 26/09/03)
38 Jenkins, Brian and Gersten, Larry N., “Protecting Public Surface Transportation against 
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices,” (2001) Mineta 
Transportation Institute.
22 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 2, Article 4
39 Jenkins, Brian and Gersten, Larry N., “Protecting Public Surface Transportation against 
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices,” (2001) Mineta 
Transportation Institute.
40 Jenkins, Brian and Gersten, Larry N., “Protecting Public Surface Transportation against 
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices,” (2001) Mineta 
Transportation Institute.
41 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist 
Activities.” (1997) Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy 
Studies, IISTPS Report 97-4, Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of 
Attacks.
42 Singapore Ministry of Transportation. Internet, available at: http://www.mot.gov.sg/kevs.htm 
(accessed on 04/03/06)
43 Jenkins, Brian Michael, “Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist 
Activities.” (1997) Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy 
Studies, IISTPS Report 97-4, Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks.
44 Jenkins, Brian and Gersten, Larry N., “Protecting Public Surface Transportation against 
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices,” (2001) Mineta 
Transportation Institute.
45 Asia One.com. Internet, available at: http://www.asial.com.sg/st/st 20050816 334786.html 
(accessed on 04/03/06)
46 Ng, Julia: “Health Minister says Exercise NorthStar a good test of hospitals' readiness.” Channel 
News Asia (8 January 2006). Internet, available at:
http://www.cbanne1newsasia.eom/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/187149/l/.html (accessed on
04/03/06)
